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MITM and Differential Fault Attack on ULBC
ID:17 View protection:Participant Only Updated time:2024-10-20 14:20:32 Views:501 Virtual Presentation

Start Time:2024-10-25 16:30

Duration:15min

Session:[RS2] Regular Session 2 [RS2-2] Privacy, Security for Networks

Abstract

ULBC is a SPN based block cipher, operates 64 bit state and use 128 bits key. Here we present meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack on ULBC. MITM attack strategy proposed by Demirci and Selcuk. In this paper we partition cipher ULBC in two halves and separate key space by two independent set and observe matching between encryption of first half with decryption of second half. By this method, called MITM attack, we can reduce the key space for exhaustive search. Basic fault analysis of ULBC requires $192$ faulty ciphertext to detect full key register. Also, we provide another fault analysis method of ULBC, which requires only average $57$ faulty ciphertext to retrieve master key. Here we assume that we can induce nibble fault in after or before substitution layer to any rounds. MITM and Differential fault attack particularly exploits weakness like dependency, linearity of designing key schedule.

 

 

Keywords
ULBC, MITM Attack, Fault attack
Speaker
Shreyasi Ghorai
West Bengal State University

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Important Dates
  • Conference date

    10-24

    2024

    -

    10-27

    2024

  • 10-14 2024

    Draft paper submission deadline

  • 10-29 2024

    Registration deadline

  • 10-31 2024

    Presentation submission deadline

Sponsored By

United Societies of Science
King Mongkut's University of Technology North Bangkok (KMUTNB)
IEEE Thailand Section
IEEE Thailand Section C Chapter

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